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Articles
The Saga of Cable TV's "Must-Carry"
Rules: Will a New Phoenix Rise from the
Constitutional Ashes?
Mark A. Conradt
No longer the stepchild of the television industry, cable tel-
evision has become the media success story of the 1980s. From
twenty four hour news to quality entertainment and sports
events, cable has been transformed from a money-losing, second-
rate, reception-enhancement service into a powerful entertain-
ment and information machine that provides greater diversity
and higher quality than could have been imagined just a few
years ago. With an increased number of viewers and a vast array
of programs to appeal to almost any viewer's palate, cable televi-
sion has become important, even indispensable, for many
Americans.
Over-the-air broadcasters, never happy with the prospect of
competition from this newer medium, have for years actively
tried to stunt cable's development, with the help of a more than
willing Federal Communications Commission (FCC). One of the
main weapons used by over-the-air broadcasters to limit the im-
pact of cable was the "must-carry" rules - FCC regulations
which mandated the carriage of local over-the-air television sta-
tions by a cable operator. The must-carry rules represented a
mainstay of cable regulation until they suffered two major con-
stitutional defeats by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
t B.A. City College of New York, 1978; J.D. New York Law School, 1981; M.S.
Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University, 1982; Assistant Professor of Law,
Graduate School of Business, Fordham University.
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Appeals in 1985 and 1987.1 The refusal of the United States Su-
preme Court to review these lower court determinations2 ap-
pears to have sealed the defeat of the must-carry rules. This de-
cision has ushered in a new era featuring less regulation of cable
television - an era that may be a boon for the cable industry
but more problematic for the public it serves.
The courts in Quincy Cable TV v. FCC3 and Century Com-
munications Corp. v. FCC4 did more than just nullify a long-
standing rule. They put broadcasters, Congress, the FCC, and
the public on notice that carte blanche regulation of cable is not
constitutional unless such regulation passes first amendment
muster.5 Although the Court in Quincy Cable and Century Com-
munications did not articulate the precise standard of review to
be applied to cable regulation, dicta in both decisions left open
the possibility of even stricter first amendment scrutiny in fu-
ture cases.'
This leads to the ultimate issue: should the FCC or Con-
gress reinstate the must-carry rules? The answer to this question
should be a qualified yes. The public interest mandates
reimposition of the must-carry rules, but the rules must be more
narrowly and intelligently tailored in order to remain within the
ambit of first amendment protection.
This Article will trace the history of cable television and the
FCC's attempts at regulation, discuss the Quincy Cable and
Century Communications decisions, and propose a new set of
must-carry rules that should pass constitutional muster.
1. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988); Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
2. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Century Communications Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2014
(1988), denying cert. to 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988); National Ass'n of Broadcasters v.
Quincy Cable TV, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986), denying cert. to 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
3. 768 F.2d 1434.
4. 835 F.2d 292.
5. Id. at 295.
6. Id. at 298.
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I. History of Cable Regulation
A. Background and Early History
The must-carry rules go back to the birth of cable television
and have taken on a number of incarnations over the years." The
rules essentially required cable operators in a given community
to transmit to their subscribers over-the-air broadcast signals
that could be received by viewers in that particular area. The
rules further mandated that should a broadcast television sta-
tion so request, a cable operator must carry: (1) all commercial
television stations within thirty-five miles of the community
served by the cable system; (2) all noncommercial educational
television stations in the same television market as the cable
system community, in a predicted Grade B contour;8 and (3) all
stations whose signals were "significantly viewed" in the
community.'
Cable television, originally known as community antenna
television (CATV), started out as a device enabling outlying
communities to pick up television signals which could not be di-
rectly received over the air. This was achieved either by connect-
7. See Rules re Microwaves-Served CATV, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683
(1965) [hereinafter First Report and Order of 1965]; CATV, Second Report and Order, 2
F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) [hereinafter Second Report and Order], discussed infra notes 26-34
and accompanying text.
8. A predicted Grade B contour is the line representing the service area in which a
good picture is available 90% of the time at 50% of receiver locations. This compares
with a Grade A contour, where a good picture is available 90% of the time at 70% of
receiver locations. Television Assignments, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148, 177
(1952) [hereinafter Sixth Report and Order].
9. J. GOODALE, ALL ABoUT CABLE § 2.06 [1][b][41 (1989). The Commission defined
"significantly viewed" as a minimum of a 3% share of viewing hours and 25% net weekly
circulation for network-affiliated stations, and a minimum of 2% share and 5% net
weekly circulation for independent stations. Id. (An "independent station" was defined
as one which did not carry more than 10 hours of network programming per week. 47
C.F.R. § 76.5(n) (1988).). As a specific example, New York City's oldest franchises, Man-
hattan Cable and Paragon Cable (the two franchises serving Manhattan) would be re-
quired to carry all the Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
stations that broadcast in the area, even those licensed in New Jersey (such as WWOR-
TV in Secaucus and WNET-TV in Newark) and parts of Long Island (WLIW-TV in
Garden City) if those stations met the threshold. However, smaller public television sta-
tions in New Jersey would not be mandated carriage since they were not considered
within the predicted Grade B Contour and were not significantly viewed by the Manhat-
tan viewing public. See PARAGON CABLE TELEVISION, A/B SWITCH NOTICE 209-35/2789
(Oct. 1989).
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ing the homes desiring the service to a master antenna (usually
erected atop a hill) or by transmitting distant signals to the
community via a microwave relay system.'0 Early cable televi-
sion systems began operations in the early 1950s, prompted by
either the lack of quality reception in rural areas or the lack of
local television outlets." Another factor promoting cable systems
was the freeze on new television licenses imposed by the FCC
from 1948 to 1952.12
The germination of this upstart medium posed a regulatory
problem because the Communications Act of 1934,11 the guiding
statute governing broadcasting, did not address cable transmis-
sions and, consequently, did not explicitly grant the FCC juris-
diction over cable. Due to this void in the Communications Act,
the FCC was initially reluctant to get involved with cable as a
medium despite the urging of the Commission's senior staff to
10. See L. PowE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 216-17
(1987); see also J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 1.02 (describing the workings of early cable
systems).
The first cable system was set up by John Walson of Mahonoy City, Pennsyl-
vania. Walson, a line serviceman with the local utility and the owner of an appli-
ance store selling television receivers, erected a large antenna on top of a utility
pole at the peak of a local mountain and strung a cable from the antenna to a
warehouse at Mahonoy City to provide sufficient reception of television programs.
Not only did Mr. Walson obtain subscribers for this system (for a $100 installa-
tion fee and a $2.00 per month charge), but this "cable" also helped to sell televi-
sion receivers.
Id. For a brief history of early cable television, see E. BARNOUw, TUBE OF PLENTY, 351-54
(1975).
11. In the early 1950s, many areas of the mountain states did not have local televi-
sion because of the sparse population and reception problems caused by the terrain. "In
a study presented to the FCC in 1965, it was indicated that in 1956 approximately 70%
of the population . . . could not receive three network signals [and] [a]bout 20% of the
population could not receive any signal without some means of augmenting their recep-
tion." J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 1.01.
12. For a history of the freeze on new television licenses, see 17 Fed. Reg. 3905-06
(1952). Due to the rapid growth of television and the limited number of VHF channels
available for distribution, the Commission held hearings during this three-and-a-half
year period and devised a frequency allocation plan created to ensure "a fair and equita-
ble" distribution. In essence, the plan created 70 UHF allocations in addition to the
existing VHF channels so that each community in the United States would be able to
have television service. Sixth Report and Order, supra note 8, at 151-55.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Act confers jurisdiction over broadcasters of radio
communications and common carriers, such as telephone companies. Id. However, be-
cause the Act preceded the development of cable systems, there is no mention of any
kind of "community antennas" or microwave relays through cable systems. Id.
[Vol. 10:9
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treat cable as a "common carrier." '14 Through the mid-1950s, the
Commission did not see the need to assert its jurisdiction since
cable was a minor player in the burgeoning broadcast scene and
did not economically challenge over-the-air broadcasters. 15 In
addition, regulation of cable broadcasting would have created
additional work for the Commission and its staff. In 1958, the
Commission reaffirmed its earlier rejection of cable regulation, 6
ruling that cable could not be considered a common carrier be-
cause the subscriber did not "control" the programming sent
over the cable. 17
By the end of the decade, however, commercial broadcasters
began to take a second look at the expansion of cable and saw it
as a potential threat to their economic well-being.'8 Shortly after
congressional subcommittee hearings on the matter,'9 the FCC
launched an inquiry to determine the impact of cable systems on
over-the-air broadcasting.2" At that time, the Commission could
not make an explicit determination as to what, if any, economic
impact cable had on broadcasters.2'
14. Just before the end of the licensing freeze in 1952, the heads of both the Broad-
cast and Common Carrier bureaus concluded in a memorandum that the Commission
must take a position regarding jurisdiction over cable, despite the lack of guidance from
the 1934 Act. They advocated classifying cable as a "common carrier" since it seemed to
meet the four-part definition stated in the Act: (1) the communications were interstate;
(2) the service was a communications service; (3) it is open to the public; and (4) it is for
hire. L. POWE, supra note 10, at 218 & n.2. For a brief discussion of the FCC's initial
review of whether cable television fell within the scope of the Communications Act of
1934, see J. GooDALE, supra note 9, § 1.05; Federal Communications Commission: CATV
and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959); and Review of Allocations
Problems, Special Problems of TV Service to Small Communities: Hearings Before the
Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3490 (1958)
(reprint of memo of Mar. 25, 1952).
15. In 1952, there were 70 cable systems with a total of 14,000 subscribers as op-
posed to 108 television stations covering 15 million viewers. By 1959, there were 560
cable systems covering 550,000 subscribers, a significant increase, but one that pales in
comparison with 510 television stations covering an audience of 43 million viewers. J.
GOODALE, supra note 9, § 1.02.
16. Frontier Broadcasting v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
17. Id. at 254.
18. See J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 1.04.
19. Id.
20. See Matter of Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV
Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development
of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
21. The FCC sent the matter back to Congress for additional hearings, which pro-
duced a bill that would permit the Commission to regulate cable television. However, the
1990]
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Cable television systems began to proliferate and revenues
surpassed those of broadcasters.2 2 Cable operators, who initially
formed rather small entities serving rural areas with poor recep-
tion, began to look at dense urban environments as offering a
greater economic opportunity. Consequently, the FCC abruptly
changed its approach to reflect the economic threat to broad-
casters. In Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC,2" the
Commission effectively reversed its prior determinations, ruling
that an application by a cable operator to expand its service
could not be granted without a hearing on the economic impact
of the proposed expansion on a local television station. The
Commission denied the application after determining that
outside signals from a cable system would have an economic im-
pact on the local television station in question.2" The District of
Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the FCC's determination, cast-
ing the economic health of over-the-air broadcasters as a para-
mount concern in any cable challenge.2
By the mid-1960s, as the idea of a new medium with spe-
cialized programming began to take shape, the FCC considered
the fundamental question of whether it should impose condi-
tions for cable operations and the extent to which cable should
be allowed to compete with broadcasting.2 It answered this
proposed legislation was never enacted into law. See United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1968). In 1966, similar legislation was proposed, but
failed to reach the House floor for debate. Id. at 170 n.30. Interestingly, the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce rendered an almost apocalyptic warning in
1959 when it stated "that the unrestricted growth of CATV would eliminate local broad-
casting, and that, in turn, this would have.., undesirable consequences" for residents of
local communities and even states by depriving them of all local television service. Id. at
175-76 n.43.
22. From 1961 to 1965 the number of over-the-air television stations increased from
527 (covering 47 million homes) to 569 (covering 52.7 million homes) as revenues grew
from $1.5 billion to $2.1 billion. In the same period, cable systems jumped from 700 in
1961 to 1,325 in 1965, increasing the number of subscribers from 700,000 to 1.5 million.
Revenues grew from $35 million to $125 million, approximately a 350% increase. See J.
GOODALE, supra note 9, § 1.04.
23. 32 F.C.C.2d 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
24. Id. Carter Mountain involved the Commission's denial of an application to the
cable company to expand its service to a Wyoming cable system. The Commission con-
cluded that the proposed expansion to another town would adversely impact the local
television station. Id.
25. 321 F.2d 359, aff'g 32 F.C.C.2d 459.
26. First Report and Order of 1965, supra note 7, at 684.
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question affirmatively and, in its First Report and Order of
1965,27 the Commission adopted comprehensive rules governing
cable television transmission over microwave relay systems.28
The rules essentially required microwave cable operators to
carry all over-the-air broadcast stations that would otherwise
reach subscribers' homes via the airwaves. This was the first
manifestation of the must-carry rules.29 Later that year, the
Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry concerning broader regu-
lations of cable television.30
One year later, a Second Report and Order31 modified the
earlier rules by expanding the application of the must-carry re-
quirements to all cable systems, not just systems using micro-
wave transmissions.2 It also modified the rules by severely lim-
iting the expansion of cable into the top 100 television markets
by prohibiting the importation of distant television signals into
those markets.3 3 In adopting these rules, the Commission did
not hide its basic motive - to try to protect the established
broadcast industry from economic dislocation by cable.3 ' The
27. First Report and Order of 1965, supra note 7.
28. Id. At first, the Commission only regulated microwave cable systems on the
grounds that microwave transmitters were common carriers of video signals and fell
under FCC jurisdiction. Note, Quincy Cable v. FCC: Judicial Deregulation of Cable Tel-
evision via the First Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1179, 1183 (1986) [hereinafter
Note, Quincy Cable].
29. First Report and Order of 1965, supra note 7, at 716-19. The rules also prohib-
ited cable systems from carrying any distant stations that duplicated the programs that
were being broadcast within 15 days before or after by any stations within 60 miles of
the cable system. Note, Quincy Cable, supra note 28, at 1183.
30. See Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d 453, 495
(1965). The FCC not only expanded the Commission's common carrier jurisdiction, but
also noted that unfair competition from cable may require more comprehensive action. It
then imposed a freeze on cable system expansion pending the outcome of the investiga-
tion. Note, Quincy Cable, supra note 28, at 1184 n.28.
31. Second Report and Order, supra note 7.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 782. However, a distant signal could be imported when the importation,
demonstrated through an evidentiary hearing, was shown to be consistent with the pub-
lic interest - particularly the viability of local broadcast service. Id. The Second Report
and Order also modified the rules by reducing the nonduplication period from 15 days to
the same day. Id. at 747.
34. Id. at 788-89. Indeed, the FCC in its Second Report and Order duly noted that
cable would sooner or later threaten broadcasters and reasonable regulation of cable was
necessary to prevent the "frustration of the F.C.C.'s overall regulatory scheme." Note,
Quincy Cable, supra note 28, at 1184 n.30 (citing Second Report and Order, supra note
7, at 734). The Commission also noted that many UHF stations were failing and con-
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must-carry rules became a centerpiece of this goal.
B. Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I
Once the FCC became actively involved in the regulation of
cable, a judicial challenge to its power was inevitable. In 1968,
the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the validity of the
FCC's regulation of cable in United States v. Southwestern
Cable,35 a case which challenged the distant importation require-
ments of the Second Report and Order.36 In Southwestern
Cable, the owner of a San Diego television station, KFMB-TV,
sought to bar Southwestern Cable, a San Diego cable firm, from
importing Los Angeles television stations.3 7 Pending considera-
tion of the merits of KFMB's argument of adverse economic im-
pact, the FCC restricted the expansion of cable service in those
areas where cable had not been in operation on or before Febru-
ary 15, 1966.38
Southwestern Cable appealed the FCC's order to the Ninth
Circuit.s9 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the FCC lacked power
under the Communications Act to issue such an order,40 despite
a contrary opinion in a similar case by the District of Columbia
Circuit.' The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling
and upheld the FCC's broad authority to regulate cable televi-
sion. Citing Section 153 of the Communications Act, the Court
cluded that the cable industry was weakening the viability of UHF. Second Report and
Order, supra note 7, at 781-82.
35. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
36. See supra note 7.
37. KFMB-TV's owners alleged that the importation of Los Angeles signals had
fragmented the San Diego audience, that expansion of such signals would reduce adver-
tising revenue of local stations, and that the ultimate consequence would be to terminate
or curtail the services provided in the San Diego area by local broadcasting stations. 392
U.S. at 160 n.4.
38. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392
U.S. 157 (1968).
39. 378 F.2d at 118.
40. Id. at 122.
41. See Buckeye Cablevision v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In this case, the
D.C. Circuit opinion upheld the constitutionality of the Commission's rules barring dis-
tant signals into the top 100 markets, when it ruled that the Commission had the juris-
diction to order an Ohio cable operator to desist from carrying the signal of a Lansing,
Michigan television station. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the "implied agency au-
thority" permitted the Commission to promulgate the "distant signal" rules and that
such rules were not an unconstitutional restraint of first amendment rights. Id. at 225.
[Vol. 10:9
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ruled that cable was subject to jurisdiction as a "service inciden-
tal to the transmission of signals,""2 and "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's ... regulation of
television broadcasting." ' Noting the serious financial difficul-
ties of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) stations,4 the Commission
ruled that the threat of unregulated and explosive growth of
cable television permitted the Commission to regulate cable
under the "reasonably ancillary" standard. 5
Although Southwestern Cable did not specifically decide
the validity of any of the 1966 FCC regulations, 6 it did open an
era of judicial support of cable regulation. In the same year, two
lower courts ruled that the non-duplication rules did not conflict
with the first amendment rights of cablecasters. 47
After these victories, the Commission tried to extend cable
access regulations by imposing rules requiring cable operators
serving more than 3,500 subscribers to "operate to a significant
42. 392 U.S. 157, 168 (1968). The Court stated: "Indeed, such communications are
defined by the Act so as to encompass 'the transmission of ... signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds,' whether by radio or cable, 'including all instrumentalities, facilities,
apparatus, and services ... incidental to such transmission.'" Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
153(a), (b) (1982)).
43. Id. at 178.
44. Id. at 176 n.44.
45. Id. at 178. The Court cited a study finding that "CATV systems may have a
substantial impact upon station revenues, that many stations, particularly in small mar-
kets, cannot readily afford such competition, and that in consequence a 'substantial per-
centage of potential new station entrants, particularly UHF, are likely to be discouraged
....' "Id. at 176 (citing Fisher & Ferrell, Community Antenna Television Systems and
Local Television Station Audience, 80 Q.J. ECON. 227, 250 (1966)).
46. Id. The opinion stated:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission's au-
thority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we
recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regula-
tion of television broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes, issue
"such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with the law," as "public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires" (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(r)). We express no
views as to the Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other
circumstances or for any other purposes.
Id. See also J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 2.02[1].
47. See Titusville Cable TV v. United States, 404 F.2d 1187, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968). The court in Black Hills
also concluded that the non-duplication rules did not violate federal copyright laws. 399
F.2d at 70.
1990]
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extent as a local outlet by originating programming."48 The goal
of these ambitious access regulations was to ensure that cable
would "provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of tel-
evision service" to the viewing audience.49 The broadcast indus-
try had shifted from an earlier claim of economic loss to a claim
that original cable programming would serve to fractionalize the
industry." The Commission explicitly rejected these claims and
concluded that such requirements were in the public interest. 1
If the 1966 rules marked cable's youth, these rules marked the
new medium's adolescence. The Commission's jurisdiction to im-
pose the local origination rules was upheld in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp.5 2 In a plurality opinion by Justice Bren-
nan,53 the Court justified the expanded scope of FCC regulations
by applying the "reasonably ancillary" standard to include the
policy objective of ensuring that a cable system satisfactorily
meets community needs. 4 In using Section 153 of the Communi-
cations Act to promote the goal of diversified programming, the
plurality opinion validated access regulation that went far be-
yond the limited objectives in Southwestern Cable.55
48. CATV, First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 214 (1969) [hereinafter First
Report and Order of 19691 (citing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry,
15 F.C.C.2d 417, 422 (1968)). The Commission interpreted "by significant extent" to
"mean something more than the origination of automated services (such as time and
weather ... ) and aural services (such as music and announcements)." This "necessitates
that the CATV operator have some kind of video cablecasting system for the production
of local live and delayed programming." The order also stated that cablecasting not only
includes programs produced by the CATV operator, but "films and tapes produced by
others, and CATV network programming." Id.
49. Id. at 208-09.
50. See id. at 202.
51. Id. at 203. In rejecting the argument that a prohibition on CATV original pro-
gramming was "necessary to prevent potential fractionalization of the audience" for
over-the-air broadcasts and the diminution of advertising revenues, the Commission
stated, in a considerable departure from the past, "a loss of audience or advertising reve-
nue to a television station is not in itself a matter of moment to the public interest
unless the result is a net loss of television service." Id. at 202-03. The Commission also
noted that there was no support on the record for this proposition. Id. at 203.
52. 406 U.S. 649, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
53. Id. Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion by three other members of the
Court: Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the
result, but not in the reasoning. Justice Douglas dissented with Justices Powell, Stewart
and Rehnquist.
54. Id. at 668.
55. See J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 996 (3d ed. 1979).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/2
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Justice Burger cast the deciding vote. Though unpersuaded
by the plurality's reasoning, he nevertheless concluded that the
Commission should be allowed discretion in making such rules."
The dissenters claimed that the FCC's action greatly exceeded
the Southwestern Cable rationale.57
C. Midwest Video II and Home Box Office - A Limitation of
FCC Power
The Court's expansive views of FCC jurisdiction was short-
lived. The Supreme Court curtailed much of those broad-based
powers in 1979 in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video
II).1 Midwest Video II involved even more ambitious
mandatory-access rules promulgated by the Commission in the
wake of its victory in Midwest Video I. These rules would have
required cable systems with more than 3,500 subscribers to de-
velop a twenty-channel capacity and to make certain channels
available for third-party access by 1986.2
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling, struck down the regula-
tions on the grounds that the access rules improperly imposed
common-carrier status on cable operators - a status which is
prohibited to broadcasters under section 3(h) of the Communi-
cations Act.60 In its often disjointed opinion, the majority noted
that cable operators "share with broadcasters a significant
amount of editorial discretion regarding what programming will
include '61 and that by imposing common-carrier status on cable
operators, the FCC diluted their editorial power.2
Largely because broadcasters may not act as common carri-
56. 406 U.S. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
57. Id. at 677 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
59. Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d
294 (1976) [hereinafter Report and Order of 1976]. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689 (1979).
60. See 440 U.S. at 700. Section 3(h) of the Communications Act prohibits broad-
casters from acting as common carriers. "Section 3(h) defines 'common carrier' as 'any
person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy ....' Id. at 701 n.10.
The Court also reiterated that common-carrier status was rejected in Southwestern
Cable. Id. at 701 n.11.
61. Id. at 707.
62. Id. at 708-09.
1990]
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ers, the Court concluded that the access rules were not reasona-
bly ancillary to broadcasting under Southwestern Cable, and
were therefore invalid. While the majority opinion did not focus
on any first amendment issues, it did state in a footnote that the
question was "not frivolous."6 3 Interestingly, the first amend-
ment question was more thoroughly discussed by the Eighth
Circuit," but the Supreme Court concentrated its opinion on the
question of statutory interpretation of the Act. 5
Two years earlier, the District of Columbia Circuit also dis-
cussed in great detail the first amendment rights of cable opera-
tors and dramatically shifted judicial philosophy toward in-
creased protection. The decision, Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC,66 paved the way for increased judicial scrutiny of cable reg-
ulations and enunciated a standard of review that would be cru-
cial in both Quincy Cable and Century Communications.
Home Box Office involved a challenge to FCC regulations
that limited the types of films, sports events, entertainment pro-
grams, and commercials that could be aired on cable and sub-
scription channels.6 7 The Commission's justifications for such re-
strictive, even draconian, limitations were similar to its reasons
for earlier regulations: to prevent unregulated cable television,
through revenue raised by subscribers, from siphoning off pro-
grams currently shown on free television and thereby denying
63. Id. at 709 n.19. Since the Supreme Court opinion rested on statutory grounds, it
did not express a view on that question, except to "acknowledge that it is not frivolous
and to make clear that the asserted constitutional issues did not determine or sharply
influence our construction of the statute." Id.
64. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1048 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440
U.S. 689 (1979). When the Eighth Circuit considered the case, it suggested that the ac-
cess rules might violate the first amendment rights of cable operators. Id.
65. See 440 U.S. 689.
66. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
67. Id. Essentially these rules prohibit pay exhibition of:
(1) feature films more than three, but less than 10, years old; (2) specific sports
events ... shown on broadcast television within the previous five years; (3) more
than the minimum number of non-specific (i.e., regular season) sports events
which had not been broadcast in any of the five preceding years...; (4) all series
programs ... [; and (5)] commercial advertising in conjunction with pay exhibition
of programming and [the FCC] limited the overall number of hours of pay opera-
tion which could be devoted to sports and feature films to 90 percent of total pay
operations.
Id. at 13. For a delineation of the regulations in question, see id. at 18-20.
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such programs to those without cable access."8 Cable television
was to be shackled in order to preserve the economic might of
free television.
In a long per curiam opinion, the court concluded not only
that the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgat-
ing these rules - because it had not demonstrated that limiting
exhibition of films and sporting events on cable was necessary to
prevent siphoning of such programming away from the over-the-
air broadcasters69 - but more significantly, that the cable rules
violated the first amendment.7 ° In this vein, the court stated
that the scarcity doctrine, which justified extensive regulations
of broadcast television, was not applicable to cable television be-
cause of cable's greater number of potential channels.7 1 The
court therefore reasoned that the traditional first amendment
standards that have been applied to the print media must also
be applied to cable operators.72
The court then enunciated a two-level standard of first
amendment review. If a regulation is intended to curtail expres-
sion then there must be a compelling state interest or "clear and
68. Id. at 25.
69. Id. at 28-34. Applying the "reasonable ancillary" standard of Southwestern
Cable, the court held that the Commission's restrictions did not satisfy the objectives of
regulating cable only to achieve ends for which it could also regulate broadcast television.
Id. at 36-43. It noted that sufficient facts were not produced to demonstrate that the
public interest justified the preservation of "free" television as the primary viewing ser-
vice. Id. Also, the opinion rejected the Commission's claim that Section 1 of the Commu-
nication Act required the Commission to formulate anti-siphoning rules. Id. at 31. Sec-
tion 1 of the Act states:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-Wide and World-Wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ... there is
created a commission to be known as the "Federal Communications Commission."
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
70. 567 F.2d at 43-51. Broadcast media are governed by more restrictive first
amendment principles than print media because there are not enough channels for all
who want to broadcast. If scarcity is not an issue in cable, then the more restrictive
regulation applied to broadcasting should not be applied to cable.
71. Id. at 44 (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943)). For a further discussion of the scarcity doctrine see Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394, 396-401 (1969).
72. 567 F.2d at 46 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1973) (rejecting a Florida access statute as an unconstitutional intrusion on a newspa-
per's first amendment rights)).
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
present danger. 7 8 If a regulation is not intended to curtail ex-
pression it must "'(1) further an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; ... and (2) the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.' "74 Ultimately, the
decision concluded that although the nonsubscription cable tele-
vision regulations were not intended to suppress free expression,
the incidental burden they placed on first amendment freedoms
exceeded any governmental interest.7 5 The court, however, de-
termined that the subscription television rules were justified.76
D. Recent Cases
During the early 1980s, the courts continued to search for a
unified constitutional standard for cable regulation. While no
single trend-setting decision was rendered, several lower court
cases discussed the first amendment implications of cable regu-
lation. Some courts upheld regulation while others rejected
regulation.
Two decisions, Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder 7 and Berkshire Cablevision of R. I., Inc. v. Burke,78 es-
sentially upheld cable access regulations based on the economic
argument that cable television was a natural monopoly and sub-
ject to some mandatory access rules.79 While some circuits have
73. Id. at 47-48. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
74. 567 F.2d at 48 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (involv-
ing draft card burning which formulated the incidental burden test)).
75. Id. at 49-50.
76. Id. at 59-60. The court upheld the rules by reasoning that National Ass'n of
Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969),
foreclosed any first amendment issues regarding subscription television regulations. 567
F.2d. at 59.
77. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981). The case involved an attempt by the city to
restrict a local cable company's operations to one defined area even though the franchise
agreement allowed the company to operate anywhere within the city limits. The Tenth
Circuit ruled that the physical limitations on the rights of way that cables could be at-
tached (either underground or through telephone poles) could justify restricting cable
systems. Id. at 1377-78. After so deciding, the court remanded the case back to the lower
court. Id. at 1380.
78. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
79. A natural monopoly exists in a market if there is a natural tendency for one
competitor to emerge with control of the market. See generally Posner, Natural Monop-
oly and Its Regulation, 21 STA. L. REv. 548 (1969). The court in Berkshire Cablevision
specifically differentiated between natural monopoly in cable and the natural monopoly
[Vol. 10:9
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relied on this economic argument, 0 others rejected it and ruled
that such a scarcity which is based solely on economic conditions
does not justify speech limitations.81 These latter courts con-
cluded that, for constitutional purposes, cable should be treated
more like a newspaper than an over-the-air broadcaster. The
most significant case espousing this view is Preferred Communi-
cations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 2 the first ruling to limit a
municipality's right to deny a cable television company access to
a local market when public utility facilities in that region were
physically capable of accommodating more than one system.8 3
After noting that cable television channels were not scarce, as
of newspapers in many cities. 571 F. Supp. at 982-88. Factors leading to a natural mo-
nopoly in the cable market include: Lower cost for one company to deliver cable service
than for two or more to deliver it, less disruption of the public streets and byways; and
inability of utilities to physically accommodate more than one system. See Note, Access
to Cable, Natural Monopoly and the First Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1663 (1986).
This was important because the Supreme Court in Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974), specifically rejected a monopoly argument when it ruled that a right of
access law for newspapers was unconstitutional. 418 U.S. at 253, 259. The court in Berk-
shire Cablevision distinguished the two media by stating that while the "lack of any
access requirement for newspapers simply does not prevent a member of the general
public from expressing his opinions in that same medium .... [by] distribut[ing] a writ-
ten message in the form of a leaflet, pamphlet, or other relatively inexpensive form of
'publication,' " a resident who cannot spend a considerable sum of money to develop a
cable system is "shut out of that medium with no way to express his ideas with the
widely acknowledged power of the small screen." 571 F. Supp. at 986.
80. See also Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th
Cir. 1982) (no first amendment violations in the process of cable franchising).
81. See Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court
stated: "[S]carcity which is the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insuffi-
cient to justify even limited government intrusion into the first amendment rights of the
conventional press, and there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a constitu-
tional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this point." Id. (citations
omitted).
82. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), a/'d, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
83. Id. Preferred Communications involved an application by a cable television
company for a license to operate in a given area of Los Angeles. Because the firm did not
participate in an auction for the franchise, as required by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53-066
(West Supp. 1984), its application was denied. Preferred Communications sued, claiming
that the city's regulation of cable television violated the operator's first amendment
rights. The Ninth Circuit, reversing the lower court, concluded that the city of Los Ange-
les could not grant an exclusive franchise to a single cable television operator when the
public utilities in that region are physically capable of accommodating more than one
system. Although the court ruled that the city could not, consistent with the first amend-
ment, "limit access by means of an auction process to a given region of the city to a
single cablevision company," it did not exclude the possibility that a city-operated
franchise system could respect first amendment rights. 754 F.2d at 1410-11.
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broadcast channels were,84 the court applied the O'Brien 5 test
and ruled that the city's franchising scheme was unconstitution-
ally overbroad.86 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit
ruling on narrower grounds.8 7
During this time, not only were many courts leaning to-
wards increased constitutional protection, but the Reagan ad-
ministration also began to view the electronic mass media as
similar to the print media for first amendment purposes.
Through its FCC chairman, who became the administration's
point man in an effort to significantly deregulate the communi-
cations industry, the Commission scrapped programming re-
quirements for radio and television 8 and nullified the "fairness
doctrine,"8 9 citing in part first amendment considerations for the
decision.90 The Commission's actions were criticized by many
84. Id. at 1403-05.
85. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
86. 754 F.2d. at 1406-07. For a more detailed analysis of Preferred Communications,
see Note, Aid or Obstruction? Government Regulation of Cable Television Meets the
First Amendment, 61 WASH. L. REV. 665 (1986). See also Tele-Communications of Key
West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which ruled that a cable
company adequately alleged a first amendment cause of action when an Air Force base
limited its cable franchise to a single firm. Id. at 1338. The decision relied on the fact
that the cable rights of way were a "public forum" entitled to significant first amend-
ment protection. Id.
87. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communication, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). The
majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist held that the first amendment claims could not be
addressed without a more developed record of the proceedings. Therefore, it remanded
the case without enunciating a first amendment standard. Id.
88. See In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), which der-
egulated radio by abolishing advertising limitations, program log requirements and news
and public affairs standards. For television deregulation, see Revision of Programming
and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Re-
quirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984), which similarly
eliminated news public affairs guidelines and advertising limitations. However, the FCC's
elimination of advertising limitations on children's programming was overturned by the
D.C. Circuit in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 745-47 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
89. Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Rec. 5043 (1987). The "fairness doc-
trine," 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982), requires radio and television stations to air balanced pro-
gramming on issues of public importance. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
90. 2 F.C.C. Rec. at 5057. The Commission concluded that the first amendment
standard should be the same for the print and broadcast media, citing in part the explo-
sive growth of broadcast outlets since Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 2 F.C.C. Rec. at 5054,
5057. Red Lion essentially upheld the Fairness Doctrine on the grounds that broadcast-
ers were subject to more regulation than the print media, since the broadcast spectrum
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/2
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members of Congress, possibly the strongest proponents of regu-
lation in the broadcast industry today."1
Ironically, Congress potentially hurt future prospects of a
unified cable policy by enacting the Cable Communications Act
of 1984,92 a complicated law that defers a great deal of jurisdic-
tion over cable television to localities, especially in the area of
franchising.93 The Cable Communications Act of 1984 replaced
rules enacted by the Commission in 1972 regarding franchising
standards and signal carriage."' However, under the Act, the
Commission retains much of the power to mandate coverage it
had acquired through the must-carry rules. 5
was a "scarce" resource. 395 U.S. at 390. The Commission's ruling abolishing the doc-
trine was upheld by the D.C. Circuit, which did not decide on the constitutional issue.
See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
91. See Cable on the Defensive on Capitol Hill, BROADCASTING, Apr. 4, 1988, at 38.
See also Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and
Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). In this report, the Commission advocated the
elimination of such regulations as the syndicated exclusivity rules, which may require
cable systems to delete programs that are exclusively broadcast on a television station in
a given market. The FCC attacked the rule because there was no support for the pro-
position that broadcast television was adversely affected by cable television. Id. at 680-
82. However, the last decade has shown cable to be a more competitive player in the
communications market, and the Commission may again rethink its prior rationale. One
recent example is the reimposition of the syndicated exclusivity rules. See Syndex
Redux: F.C.C. Levels the Playing Field, BROADCASTING, May 23, 1988, at 31-33.
92. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1984).
93. The law essentially redefines a cable system by eliminating the earlier FCC re-
quirement of 50 or more subscribers to a system with multiple subscribers. See Ross &
Brick, The Cable Act of 1984 - How Did We Get There and Where Are We Going?, 39
FED. COM. L.J. 27, 37 (1986); see also 47 U.S.C. § 522(6). The Act deregulates pricing for
"basic cable systems" (any system which includes the retransmission of local television
signals) unless no "effective competition" is present in the given area, 47 U.S.C § 522(2);
reintroduces public access channels in all cable systems for the first time since Midwest
Video II and retains prior FCC rules regarding the Fairness Doctrine, 47 C.F.R. § 76.209
(1988). Probably the most significant aspect of the Act is that it gives the states and
cities major control over the franchise process and franchise fees. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the contents of the Act, see Meyerson, The Cable Communications Act of 1984: A
Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543 (1985).
94. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
95. See Ross & Brick, supra note 93, at 46. While the 1984 Act is more comprehen-
sive and deals with changes in the industry, Lfle goal of dualism between the federal
government and the states is preserved as both entities have a great say in cable televi-
sion today.
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II. Quincy Cable v. FCC
The rapidly expanding cable market and increased aggres-
siveness of cable operators in challenging FCC regulations made
the must-carry rules ripe for a judicial challenge. The possible
constitutional problems arising when the FCC compelled a pri-
vate cable owner to transmit designated stations and programs
seemed to be a legitimate claim for a cable operator, particularly
after victories in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp."' and Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC97 and in the anti-regulatory climate that was
so widespread through the 1980s.
The first challenge to the must-carry rules came in 1984.98
Quincy Cable TV, the operator of a cable system in Quincy,
Washington, and Turner Broadcasting System claimed that
these rules violated their first amendment rights to carry
whatever signals cable operators deemed fit to best serve their
audience.9 Specifically, Quincy Cable sought permission from
the Commission to delete three local network affiliated sta-
tions.'00 Even though the petition was denied by the Commis-
sion's Cable Television Bureau, Quincy Cable nevertheless de-
leted two of the stations and appealed the Cable Television
Bureau's determination, claiming that the must-carry rules vio-
lated the first amendment.'
Turner Broadcasting System (TBS), the operator of an in-
dependent broadcast station from Atlanta and a twenty-four
hour news and information service, both of which are carried on
cable systems across the country, argued that these rules poten-
96. 440 U.S. 689 (1979); see supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
97. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
98. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
99. Id. at 1452.
100. Id. at 1447. The company served a small town, located between Seattle and
Spokane, and only had a 12-channel capacity. In 1980, it sought to delete three network
affiliate broadcast stations from Spokane (it decided to keep the affiliates broadcasting
out of Seattle) and substitute other programming, specifically from WOR-TV in New
York (a "superstation" transmitted on cable systems throughout the country); ESPN
(Entertainment and Sport Programming Network); Nickelodeon (a cable network geared
to children); and Cable News Network (a 24-hour news and information service operated
by Turner Broadcasting System). Note, The Must Carry Rules After Quincy Cable, Inc.
v. Federal Communication Commission: The Attempt to Harmonize Mandatory Car-
riage with Freedom of Speech, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 745 (1987).
101. 768 F.2d at 1447.
[Vol. 10:9
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/2
CABLE TV'S "MUST-CARRY RULES"
tially deprived it of access to cable systems saturated with must-
carry signals, and thereby violated its right to broadcast.102 As
with Quincy Cable, the Commission denied TBS's petition. TBS
appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit asking the court
either to find the rules unconstitutional or to compel the Com-
mission to institute proceedings to reconsider them.'
The court concluded that the must-carry rules, as then codi-
fied, violated the first amendment rights of cable operators. Yet,
by its language and scope, Judge Skelly Wright's opinion"°
served as more than just a resounding defeat for the FCC and
over-the-air broadcasters: it delved into the first amendment
rights of cable operators in a manner unseen by this court since
Home Box Office.
While Home Box Office and other decisions applied the "in-
cidental burden" test of O'Brien,1°5 the court in Quincy Cable
applied a higher degree of first amendment protection. Stating
at the outset that cable television "warrants a standard of review
distinct from that applied to broadcasters," the court noted that
a higher standard of first amendment scrutiny must be applied
in evaluating regulations governing cable television as compared
with regulations governing over-the-air broadcasters.' Since
cable technology permits a system to carry up to 200 signals, the
scarcity rationale that has justified government regulation over
102. Id. at 1446. Turner Broadcasting Service (TBS) operates WTBS, a UHF inde-
pendent broadcast station in Atlanta which is carried on cable systems throughout the
United States. It was the first of a genre of local stations to become "superstations."
Additionally, TBS also operates a 24-hour news and information service called Cable
News Network (CNN), and a companion service, called CNN Headline News. Note,
supra note 100, at 761 nn.122-23. Since the case was decided, TBS started another cable
channel called Turner Network Television (TNT).
103. 768 F.2d at 1446. TBS had petitioned the Commission in 1980 to rule on the
constitutionality of the must-carry rules. It took the Commission over three years to act
on the petition, despite the considerable interest generated among other broadcasters
and cable operators. Extensive comments were filed on behalf of TBS's claim. Two weeks
after TBS motioned the D.C. Circuit to force the FCC to act on its petition, the Commis-
sion denied it. Id. at 1445-46.
104. Judge Skelly Wright's opinion was joined by Judges Ginsberg and Bork. The
fact that these three jurists, of very differing judicial philosophy, joined in this opinion
demonstrates that this increased first amendment protection is shared by those of differ-
ing legal beliefs.
105. 567 F.2d at 48-51; see also Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Ange-
les, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
106. 768 F.2d at 1448.
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the airwaves does not apply to cable. In this respect, cable is
more akin to newspapers than over-the-air broadcasters. 07
The court was equally unsympathetic to the argument that
the natural monopoly status of cable justifies content regulation.
Noting its prior rejection of this argument, 08 the court stated
that any economic constraints imposed by any alleged monopoly
had no relevance to this case. 109
The court then considered the question of what standard to
apply to justify limitations on a cable operator's first amend-
ment rights." 0 Citing Home Box Office, the court reduced the
question to the following: whether the must-carry rules merely
serve as an "incidental burden" on speech under the O'Brien
test or whether the rules are a direct restriction of expression
because of their "pervasive effect on [the] audience," mandating
an even more stringent first amendment test. 1 '
Under Home Box Office, if the must-carry rules fall within
the first category, they would be sustained if they "further[ ] an
important or substantial government interest ... and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest,""' a
standard which, although stringent, could theoretically be met.
However, if the rules were deemed to directly restrict expres-
sion, the government's burden of proof would be heavier still
and a compelling interest would have to be shown."'
The court never reached the question of which standard to
apply because it found that the must-carry rules utterly lacked
justification, even under the incidental standard." 4 The court
107. Id. The scarcity rationale justifies broadcast regulation because the potential
number of over-the-air radio and television stations is limited by a finite number of
channels in the available spectrum. This creates a limitation of access for all those who
would want their ideas and programs heard. Therefore, government regulations that pro-
vide for broadcasting of many viewpoints are justified by the scarcity of signals. Red
Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969). Government regulation of the
print media was expressly rejected since no corresponding scarcity exists. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
108. 768 F.2d at 1449-50.
109. Id. at 1450.
110. Id. at 1454.
111. Id. at 1450.
112. Id. at 1451 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1462-63.
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stated, "[Olur analysis leaves us with no doubt that the must-
carry rules, as currently drafted, represent a fatally overbroad
response to the perceived fear that cable will displace free, local
television."11 5
The court carefully dissected the FCC's principal reasons
for creating the must-carry rules. The FCC asserted that with-
out the regulation, cable subscribers would disconnect their an-
tennas and cease to view locally available over-the-air television
stations and that even if only a small number of cable subscrib-
ers abandoned local television, this would "affect the economic
vitality of local broadcasting. '" 1 6 Because there was no substan-
tial evidence to bolster these claims, the court found it impossi-
ble to defer to the Commission. Noting that over twenty years
had passed since the Commission first asserted jurisdiction over
cable television, the court stated that the Commission was now
"capable of the most sophisticated analysis of the effects of
cable" but that it continued to rely on mere "speculative allega-
tions" to justify the must-carry rules.' 7 "[Tihe Commission has
failed to adequately demonstrate that an unregulated cable in-
dustry poses a serious threat to local broadcasting and, more
particularly, that the must-carry rules in fact serve to alleviate
this threat.11 18 As an additional attack on the Commission's un-
supported allegations, the court noted that a simple and inex-
pensive device (known as an A/B switch) permits subscribers to
use their antennas to receive over-the-air signals. 19 In other
words, if the FCC felt the need to protect over-the-air broad-
casters, an all-encompassing set of must-carry rules was not the
constitutional way to do it. According to the court:
The rules indiscriminately protect each and every broadcaster re-
gardless of the quantity of local service available in the commu-
nity and irrespective of the number of local outlets already car-
ried by the cable operator. The 18th station is entitled to carriage
no less than the first even if its programming is virtually duplica-
tive of the viewing fare already transmitted over the cable
115. Id. at 1459.
116. Id. at 1457.
117. Id. at 1458.
118. Id. at 1459.
119. Id. at 1457 n.48.
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system.'
This blanket protection went way beyond the objective of the
regulation, because every broadcaster "from the struggling UHF
educational station to the most profitable VHF network affili-
ate" had the right to expect mandatory carriage. 2'
Although the court never reached the question of which
standard of first amendment scrutiny would control, it came
fairly close to stating that the must-carry rules would be evalu-
ated under the stringent standard applied to regulations that di-
rectly curtail freedom of expression, as compared with the "inci-
dental burden" standard ultimately applied by the court. In
analyzing the Commission's economic reasons for imposing the
must-carry rules, the court determined that the objectives of the
rules are a "far cry from the sort of interests that typically have
been viewed as imposing a merely 'incidental' burden on speech.
... Their very purpose is to bolster the fortunes of local broad-
casters even if the inevitable consequence of implementing that
goal is to create an overwhelming competitive advantage over
cable programmers."' 22 It added:
In the case of systems saturated with mandatory signals, cable
programmers are shut out entirely from the only forum capable of
conveying their programming. Because "the concept that govern-
ment may restrict the speech of some elements of society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment," . . . the conclusion that the must-carry rules
burden First Amendment rights only incidentally is far from
inevitable.2 3
The court noted that cable operators are not mere "passive
conduits of broadcast signals,"'12 4 but indeed carry an important
editorial function, which is compromised by the imposition of
the must-carry rules. It stated that the rules effectively "transfer
[editorial] control to local broadcasters who already have a de-
120. Id. at 1460.
121. Id. at 1462.
122. Id. at 1451.
123. Id. at 1451-52. The court noted that in the print media, it would be "highly
unlikely" that a law requiring newspaper vendors to carry local publications would be
treated as an incidental burden on speech. Id. at 1452 n.37.
124. Id. at 1452.
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livery mechanism granted by the government without cost and
capable of bypassing the cable system altogether."125 The court
continued:
In short, our examination of the purposes that underlie the must-
carry rules, the nature and degree of the intrusions they effect,
and prior judicial treatment of analogous regulations leaves us
with serious doubts about the propriety of applying the standard
of review reserved for incidental burdens on speech .... [T]he
rules nonetheless profoundly affect values that lie near the heart
of the First Amendment. They favor one group of speakers over
another. They severely impinge on editorial discretion. And, most
importantly, if a system's channel capacity is substantially or
completely occupied by mandatory signals, the rules prevent
cable programmers from reaching their intended audience even if
that result directly contravenes the preference of cable
subscribers.126
Even though the court did not directly address this issue,
this dictum may be important for future cases involving FCC
regulation of cable. The court in Quincy Cable ruled the must-
carry rules unconstitutional in their then-current form, but
noted that the Commission could theoretically redraft them so
as to pass constitutional muster.127
III. The New Must-Carry Rules and Century
Communications
The Commission did not appeal Quincy Cable 28 and only
began to consider rewriting the rules after considerable pressure
from broadcasters. 2 9 When the Commission announced that it
was considering the introduction of revised must-carry rules,
many in the broadcast industry submitted proposals. 130 After
125. Id. at 1453.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1463.
128. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
129. Note, supra note 100, at 765-66. Broadcast trade associations, most notably the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Association of Independent Net-
work Television Stations, urged Chairman Mark Fowler to take some action to restore
the rules. Id. at 766 n.160.
130. Id. at 767. For example, the Association of Independent Network Television
Stations proposed a set of must-carry rules under the compulsory license provision of the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982). Id. at 767 n.166.
1990]
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
months of negotiations with broadcast trade associations, the
FCC promulgated a scaled-down version of the must-carry rules.
In November 1986, sixteen months after Quincy Cable was
handed down, the FCC released its revised set of must-carry
rules in an attempt to accommodate the court.
The revised must-carry rules'' were of an interim nature,
lasting for a period of five years. During that time, cable opera-
tors would be required to install an input selector switch (an A/
B switch) to permit subscribers to keep their television antennas
and receive broadcast signals over the air. The Commission rea-
soned that during the five-year period the public would become
familiar with the A/B switch, and any past dependence on the
must-carry rules would be eliminated. Cable operators were re-
quired to issue the A/B switch to the customer, to offer installa-
tion at a reasonable fee, 32 and to inform the customer of the
phase-out of the must-carry rules. 133
Compared with the original must-carry rules, the interim
rules substantially reduced the number of channels a cable oper-
ator had to carry. Cable systems with twenty channels or fewer
were not required to carry any commercial stations; systems
with between twenty-one and twenty-nine stations were re-
quired to carry up to seven broadcast stations; and systems with
125 or more channels were required to devote up to twenty-five
percent of their system to must-carry signals. 3' These rules also
required cable systems to carry only those over-the-air television
stations which were viewed in at least five percent of noncable
households in the county in which the cable system was lo-
cated. 3  They further reduced the number of noncommercial
over-the-air television stations a cable system had to carry by
requiring systems with fewer than fifty-four channels to carry at
least one noncommercial station and systems with fifty-four
131. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Tele-
vision Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, Report and Order, 1 F.C.C. Rec.
864 (1986) [hereinafter Report and Order of 1986].
132. Id. at 866.
133. Id. at 867.
134. 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (1986); see also J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 2.06[3][a]; Note,
supra note 100, at 771.
135. Report and Order of 1986, supra note 131, at 887.
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channels or more to carry at least two noncommercial stations.' 6
Not only did the Commission limit the scope of the new
rules as compared with the old, but it changed the rationale be-
hind them. The FCC now reasoned that the new rules were
needed so that viewers could become accustomed to the A/B
switch.'37 Cable's economic impact on broadcasters, however,
was still a consideration in these scaled-down must-carry rules.
Recall that the Commission only enacted these rules after exten-
sive pressure from the broadcasting industry. The new rules
were still designed to keep some sort of mandatory carriage re-
quirement until the A/B switch would become an accepted part
of a cable user's equipment.
Constitutional challenges were soon brought against the in-
terim version of the must-carry rules by Century Communica-
tions Corporation and thirteen other cable operators who
claimed that the rules violated their first amendment rights. 3 '
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Century Communications
Corp. v. FCC,19 reached the same result as it did in Quincy
Cable.' °
Chief Judge Wald, writing for the court, struck down these
scaled-down rules as overbroad and lacking in justification."'
As in Quincy Cable the court did not decide which standard to
apply to the rules because the new must-carry rules failed to sat-
isfy even the "incidental burden" test under United States v.
O'Brien."4
The court noted that the FCC's justification for these rules
was markedly different from its justification for the original
136. See J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 2.06 [3][a](1).
137. Report and Order of 1986, supra note 131, at 882, 885-86; 47 C.F.R. § 76.64
(1987).
138. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
other petitioners besides Century included: Hubbard Broadcasting, Association of Inde-
pendent Television Stations, Spanish International Communications Corp., Univision,
Inc., National Association of Broadcasters, Lincoln Broadcasting Co., National Cable
Television Association, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting, National Association of Public Television, Public Broad-
casting Service, and National Broadcasting Co. Id.
139. Id.
140. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
141. 835 F.2d at 304.
142. 391 U.S. 367, 303-04 (1968).
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must-carry rules in Quincy Cable.'43 The Commission argued
that the interim rules were necessary to "tide the broadcast in-
dustry and viewers through the period" during which A/B
switches were introduced to the public.'44 The court concluded
that the FCC's judgment was "predicated not upon substantial
evidence but rather upon several highly dubious assertions"
from which the court concluded "that the need for a new saga of
must-carry rules is more speculative than real."'"
The court rejected each of the Commission's premises. First,
it stated that the FCC presented little objective evidence -
such as surveys or polls - to support its contention that cable
subscribers were unfamiliar with A/B switches and that a five-
year interim period of must-carry rules were needed to educate
the public. 4 ' Next, the court stated that evidence presented by
the Commission did not justify a finding that the must-carry
rules were needed for five years.147 This evidence indicated that
only one percent of cable households had an A/B switch, and
that half of all cable viewers surveyed by the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters stated that they would buy an A/B switch if
local broadcast stations were dropped by their local cable sys-
tem."4 8 The court specifically noted that the reason so few view-
ers had A/B switches was that the switches were not necessary
because of the must-carry rules.'49
The court also rejected the claim that cable subscribers, es-
pecially those with videocassette recorders, need the five-year
time to learn how to cope with the complicated problems of in-
stalling the A/B switch.1 0 The court dismissed this argument by
saying:
In a culture in which even costly items like the video-cassette re-
corder, the cordless telephone, the compact disc-player and the
home computer have spread like wildfire, it begs incredulity to
simply assume that consumers are so unresponsive that within
143. 835 F.2d at 299.
144. Id. at 299 n.4 (citing Report and Order of 1986, supra note 131).
145. Id. at 300.
146. Id. at 300-01.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 301.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 302.
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the span of five years they would not manage to purchase an inex-
pensive hardware-store switch upon learning that it could provide
access to a considerable storehouse of new television stations and
shows."5
After concluding that the Commission had failed to demon-
strate that the new must-carry rules furthered a substantial gov-
ernmental interest which outweighed the incidental burden on
first amendment interests, the court stated that the five-year in-
terim period was too long, because no evidence had been
presented to justify such a lengthy period of time.152 "Opting for
a five-year interim period," the court wrote, "merely delays the
inevitable, but almost certainly brief, period during which TV
owners will learn of, purchase, and install the requisite equip-
ment." '53 "It is wholly unclear to us why it should take five years
to inform consumers that with the installation of a $7.50 switch
and a television antenna they can view more local channels. The
FCC report does nothing to shed light on this matter."' 54
As in Quincy Cable, the court in Century Communications
did not find the must-carry rules per se unconstitutional, but
held that the regulations neither furthered a substantial govern-
mental interest nor qualified as brief enough in duration to be
considered narrowly tailored to satisfy the "incidental burden"
test.155 Yet, the court added, in a final jab at the Commission,
"[w]hen trenching on first amendment interests, even inciden-
tally, the government must be able to adduce either empirical
support or at least sound reasoning on behalf of its measures.' 56
IV. Salvaging a Limited Must-Carry Requirement for the
Public Interest
A. Analysis
Notably, the FCC's justification for the original must-carry
rules seemed more persuasive than the almost arbitrary set of
revised rules that were struck down in Century Communications
151. Id.
152. Id. at 300-03.
153. Id. at 304.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Corp. v. FCC. At the time the must-carry rules were promul-
gated, the Commission's priority of economic protectionism for
over-the-air broadcasters, particularly UHF stations, seemed ra-
tional enough. An unregulated, unlicensed cable industry would
threaten the economic viability of broadcast television. The
Commission would then be powerless to put into effect its goal
of giving "all communities of appreciable size at least one televi-
sion [station] as an outlet for local self-expression. '1 7 Cable
penetration has increased to over fifty percent of the United
States today.1 58 Coupling this increase with an increase in cable
profitability' 59 and a decrease in the number of "free" television
viewers,1e° it could be contended that the economic protectionist
argument is even more compelling today than it was in 1965.
In fact, broadcast groups have continued to make rational
economic arguments for the reimposition of the rules.' One
study concluded that without the must-carry rules, cable opera-
tors might drop broadcast stations if they believe it would in-
crease spot advertising, or pay subscriptions, or make room for
more lucrative cable-only program services.16 2 Broadcasters view
with particular alarm the prospects of weak UHF stations whose
syndicated programming is hardly distinguishable from many
cable "superstations," and who are generally less profitable than
VHF stations.6 3
In fact, deletions of local stations have occurred in Massa-
chusetts" and Utah.6 5 Stations in Alabama and Texas were af-
157. See United States v. Southwestern Cable, Inc., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962)).
158. See By the Numbers, BROADCASTING, July 4, 1988, at 12.
159. Zoglin, The Big Boys' Blues, TIME, Oct. 17, 1988, at 56-61.
160. Landrove & Lipman, Cable Television Ad Revenues Poised for Growth in 1988,
Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1988, at 32, col. 2.
161. See Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters (July 8, 1988) (re-
sponding to the Commission's Inquiry into the Availability of Broadcast Television Sig-
nals on Cable Television Systems, No. 88-138 (1988)) [hereinafter NAB Comments].
162. Id. at 10 (citing a study by Dr. Michael 0. Wirth, Chairperson of the Depart-
ment of Mass Communications, University of Denver, contained in the Appendix D-1 at
7-16).
163. Id. (See study by Dr. Michael 0. Wirth in the Appendix D-1 at 7-8.)
164. Id. at 13-14. Appendix D-3 contains affidavits of Donald Moore, owner of
WCVX-TV, Vineyard Haven, Mass.; Mr. Moore's station was ultimately forced into
bankruptcy, primarily, according to the affidavit, because it was unable to obtain car-
riage on the largest local cable system.
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fected when their local cable operators changed their cable posi-
tions to make room for more lucrative cable networks.'66 There
have also been instances where cable systems operators have de-
manded additional compensation for keeping a station on its
systems nationwide.'67
The Commission's economic assumptions regarding the
original must-carry rules were not persuasive enough to prevent
the court in Quincy Cable from concluding that the rules were
overbroad and constitutionally suspect under the less stringent,
but nevertheless rigorous United States v. O'Brien standard.'68
Its claims in Century Cable justifying the revised must-carry
rules show little rhyme or reason. Instead of basing its justifica-
tion for the revised rules on general economic arguments, the
Commission changed course and relied on an arbitrary stop-gap
period during which consumers were to get acquainted with A/B
switches.'6 9 In a first amendment matter, such rulemaking is es-
pecially irresponsible and serves to embarrass the agency in-
volved, especially after losing in the courts below.'7 °
165. Id. at 14-15 Appendix D-4 contains the affidavit of Mark Goldstein, President
of KOOG-TV, Ogden, Utah, which was refused carriage on most cable systems in the
station's service area. This "severely hampered [the station's] efforts to attract local and
national advertisers." The owner of the station was subsequently forced to sell its inter-
est in the station because it "lost significant sums of money as a result of the inability to
attract advertiser support" due to its carriage problems.
166. Id. at 15. This channel repositioning can injure a station because its cable
channel assignment is different from its over-the-air channel. This can cause viewer con-
fusion as to the proper channel.
167. Id. at 22-23. For example, WSYM-TV in Lansing, Michigan was told by a local
cable company after Quincy Cable TV, Inc. that it would be charged for carriage; the
owner of a cable system in Jefferson County, Missouri sent a letter to 12 former must-
carry stations threatening to drop them unless they each paid $8,000 in equipment costs.
Some of the monies paid were considerable. For example, WAYK in Melbourne, Florida
had to pay local cable systems an average of $35,000 each, and KUTP, a UHF station in
Phoenix had to pay Times Mirror cable systems $150,000 annually for carriage.
168. Neither the five year time period, nor the distinctions among cable systems of
the numbers of over-the-air stations they had to carry was rationally justified in the
decision. United States v. O'Brien, 391 United States 367 (1968).
169. Indeed, the Solicitor General, in his recommendation not to appeal Century
Communications, noted that the new, narrowly-tailored rules did not present a suitable
issue for appeal. He stated, however, that the original rules would have presented a bet-
ter case for review because of the direct first amendment considerations. See Govern-
ment Won't Appeal Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 28, 1988, at 37.
170. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 745-46 (D.C. Cir.
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The FCC has not yet announced any new revision of the
must-carry rules, although one member of the Commission has
stated his advocacy for reimposition of the rules,"" and a com-
promise between broadcasting and cable interests has been dis-
cussed. 17 2 However, under pressure from Congress, the FCC de-
cided to survey broadcasters to determine what impact the loss
of the must-carry rules has had on broadcasting. 7 ' Thirty-one
percent of the television stations that responded reported that
after Quincy Cable they had been dropped from cable systems
or that they had been denied coverages. Thirty-four percent re-
ported that their signal had been repositioned from one cable
channel to another. 74 Twenty percent of the cable systems re-
sponding reported that they had dropped broadcast signals or
were denying carriage. Twenty-three percent reported that they
were repositioning stations. 75 This survey apparently added
weight to the broadcast industry's own evidence that a cable in-
dustry unfettered by must-carry rules frequently adversely af-
fected the carriage of broadcast stations; however, the cable in-
dustry vigorously objected to the methodology of the survey, and
the FCC refused to draw any conclusions from it.17
Both Quincy Cable and Century Communications mark the
171. See, Must Carry From a Commissioner's Point of View, BROADCASTING, Mar.
28, 1988, at 28 (remarks of Commissioner James H. Quello to Alabama Broadcasters
Association).
172. A proposed compromise between the National Association of Broadcasters and
the National Cable Television Association that would have guaranteed broadcasters free
carriage of their signals fell apart because of opposition by the Association of Indepen-
dent Television Stations. The latter group objected to the plan, which was similar to the
1986 version of the must-carry rules nullified by the court in Century Communications,
because it would have given cable operators the right to reposition independent and
UHF channels from their current channel positions to less desirable slots on the UHF
band. See The Must-Carry Deal that Almost Was, BROADCASTING, July 17, 1989, at 27-
28.
173. The survey was mailed out to every broadcast station and cable system in the
United States in May and June, 1988. It dealt with the effect of the nullification of the
must-carry rules after Quincy Cable. See Real-World Data on A Post-Must-Carry
World, BROADCASTING, Sept. 5, 1988, at 30-31.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Representatives from the cable and broadcasting industries noted that the
questionnaire was "confusing" and likely to produce unclear results. It should be noted
that only 67% of the television stations and 51% of the cable systems responded to the
survey.
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ending of a regulation that many cable operators considered an
albatross around their economic and programming necks. The
court, the Commission, and the broadcast trade associations did
not adequately consider the important issue of whether the pub-
lic interest was served in removing the must-carry rules.
Because both cable television and broadcasters are subject
to the "public interest" standard, 177 the effect of the nullification
of the must-carry rules should be discussed in relation to its ef-
fect on the public - an effect that may be more bad than good
in certain areas of the country.
Although the courts applied legitimate constitutional argu-
ments to void the must-carry rules as they existed, they did not
preclude the possibility of future must-carry rules that may be
constitutionally sound.17s The FCC should prepare a narrowly-
tailored set of revised must-carry rules that may be not only per-
missible, but a valuable protection for certain segments of the
viewing public.
B. The Proposed Rule
A proposal to link the must-carry rules to the compulsory
license provision in the 1976 Copyright Act 179 has been advo-
cated by broadcast groups.' 80 This provision enables a cable op-
erator to avoid copyright liability for retransmitting distant-sig-
177. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 32 F.C.C.2d 459, 461 (1962),
aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
178. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
179. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
180. Id. This section was passed in response to a Supreme Court decision in Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), which ruled that
cable retransmission of over-the-air programs did not constitute a "performance" under
the 1909 Copyright Act. The 1976 Act was a compromise between the interests of copy-
right holders and those of cable operators. It essentially requires a cable system to pay a
fixed percentage of its gross revenue for the right to carry a distant signal. The funds are
received by the Register of Copyrights and then distributed to copyright owners whose
works are carried by the cable system.
The actual royalty amounts are based on a rather complex formula. A system with
semi-annual gross receipts of less than $75,000 pays a flat rate of $28 regardless of the
number of broadcast signals carried. A system grossing between $75,000 and $292,000
semi-annually pays 0.5% of the first $146,000 and 1% on revenue in excess of that
amount. Larger systems pay royalties based on the actual quantity and type of distant
signals carried. For a more detailed discussion, see J. GOODALE, supra note 9, § 6.03 [4].
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nal non-network programs if it pays a modest statutory fee,' an
amount much less than normal copyright royalties. Advocates of
this plan would require a cable system to supply some sort of
carriage of over-the-air television stations in return for the com-
pulsory license. Yet, in light of the constitutional constraints of
Quincy Cable and Century Communications, even this idea may
not be narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional muster.
To link the must-carry rules to what is, effectively, a discount on
the payment of copyright royalties is to offer cable operators a
quid pro quo that may be politically expedient but not necessa-
rily constitutional.
The most direct and constitutionally valid proposal would
impose a must-carry requirement on cable systems in areas in
which there are demonstrated reception deficiencies. Although
there are more broadcast television stations today than when the
must-carry rules were first promulgated, l8 2 there are still areas
in which viewers cannot receive an adequate television picture
due to distance, geographic factors, or architectural impedi-
ments.1"' For viewers in these areas18 4 to receive an adequate
signal, they must subscribe to a cable television system. Ironi-
cally, despite the evolution of cable from a passive medium into
a programming medium, these viewers are likely to subscribe to
cable for the very reason it was first created - to improve re-
ception. The very reason Manhattan was the first urban area to
be wired for cable in the mid-1960s was because television recep-
tion was so poor.8 5 A recent nationwide survey indicates that
this reasoning is prevalent among cable subscribers all over the
country, not just where reception is poor.'
181. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
182. As of June, 1988, there were a total of 1631 commercial and educational televi-
sion stations on the air. By the Numbers, BROADCASTING, June 6, 1988, at 14. In the late
1960's there were about 840. BROADCASTING Y.B. 1969 at 11.
183. NAB Comments, supra note 161, at 28 n.37.
184. Id. Affidavit from stations located in major cities including Los Angeles and
Pittsburgh and affidavits from Appalachian counties in Kentucky and western Pennsyl-
vania state that "terrain features" inhibit or preclude local reception of stations.
185. See 3 Given Franchises to Provide Cable for Better City TV, N.Y. Times, Dec.
3, 1965, at 1, col. 3 (describing New York City's decision to award cable franchises in
Manhattan with the specific purpose of improving television reception).
186. NAB Comments, supra note 161. In a survey done for the National Association
of Broadcasters, nearly two-thirds of the respondents stated that better reception was
their principal reason for subscribing to cable, and that 98% of the cable homes surveyed
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For subscribers in these areas, there really is no alternative
to cable. An A/B switch to pick up over-the-air television sta-
tions would not help many subscribers in Manhattan or West
Virginia because of the poor over-the-air reception. Therefore,
the FCC should propose new must-carry rules specifically
targeted for areas with over-the-air reception problems.
The rules would work like this: if a cable operator sought to
drop a broadcast station or stations from its cable system, it
would have the right to do so. However, after the station was
dropped, the cable operator would be required to take a random
sample of customers, conducted by an outside polling or market
research organization, to determine if customers were able to get
the dropped stations adequately with an A/B switch. If a signifi-
cant number of viewers would not receive an adequate picture,
the cable company would be required to carry the station. The
rules would permit the cable franchisee to drop the station
before polling or viewer surveys are conducted, to avoid any con-
stitutional challenges claiming that the must-carry actions were
without evidentiary basis.
Since the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984"'7 con-
tinues to grant federal preemption in the area of signal car-
riage,188 no change in statutory law would be necessary to imple-
ment these rules. Therefore, under federal law, the polling
requirement could be imposed on local cable franchisees without
any violation of the Cable Act's franchising sections.189 The pro-
posed rules would also rely on a relatively inexpensive polling
system. Rather than actually testing reception throughout its
service area, a procedure that would be prohibitively expensive,
they would permit the cable company to delete broadcast sta-
tions before requiring any activities to justify that action.
Despite the prior constitutional rejections of the must-carry
rules, these revised rules may pass muster under the "incidental
burden" test. First, ensuring proper television reception to all in
did not have rooftop antennas. NAB Comments, supra note 161, at exhibit 1.
187. 47 U.S.C. § 521-559 (1984).
188. Id. See also Ross & Brick, The Cable Act of 1984 - How Did We Get There
and Where Are We Going?, 39 FED. CoM. L.J. 27, 47 (1987).
189. 47 U.S.C.S. § 556 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). For a thorough discussion of local
franchising, see Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing
Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543, 551-84 (1985).
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a given area is a substantial governmental interest, deriving
from one of the major goals of the Communications Act. 90 Fur-
thermore, it is important for the future of over-the-air broad-
casters that viewers be able to receive signals, even where recep-
tion is difficult. Secondly, applying the rules only to situations in
which a significant number of viewers cannot adequately receive
the dropped station is narrowly enough tailored so as to not be
constitutionally overbroad. These proposed must-carry rules
would only apply to areas with demonstrated reception
problems; areas with strong over-the-air reception would be ex-
empt. Also, the rules would especially protect UHF sta-
tions- many of which are Public Broadcast Service affili-
ates- which are most vulnerable to over-the-air reception
problems. If VHF stations are well received in an area, but one
or more UHF stations are not, the cable operators would only be
required to carry the UHF stations.
In devising these standards, it is assumed that the "inciden-
tal burden" test is applicable. However, neither Quincy Cable
nor Century Communications definitely stated whether this test
or the more rigorous "compelling state interest" test should ap-
ply. It is far from certain that these new rules would be upheld
under the more difficult test. If these rules were declared uncon-
stitutional, the victory would be sweet for a few first amendment
aficionados and the cable interests, but certainly not for those
viewers who are unable to receive their favorite television pro-
grams due to the poor reception. This is not what the public
interest is about.
V. Conclusion
The decisions in Quincy Cable and Century Communica-
tions put the FCC on notice that the courts will not hesitate to
review and strike down cable regulations that are deemed un-
constitutional and that the courts will continue to apply rigorous
standards in reviewing cable regulations. The FCC will have to
take this into consideration if it decides to resurrect the must-
carry rules in yet another incarnation. The public, however,
190. Section 1 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982), explicitly states
that nationwide access by all Americans to broadcast outlets is a major goal of the Act.
See also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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needs some guarantee of adequate television reception, and the
public interest should compel the Commission to draft a new set
of must-carry rules for viewers in reception-deficient areas of the
country. A new, leaner, and specifically-tailored set of must-
carry rules should, like the legendary phoenix, rise from the con-
stitutional ashes of Quincy Cable and Century Communications.
35
